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Abstract: 
 
What explains the length of a Member of the European Parliament’s career? Little 
evidence of careerism has been uncovered in the European Parliament, 
particularly when compared to studies of legislator tenure in the U.S. Congress. 
Due to the different historical contexts in which these two legislatures developed, 
it seems reasonable to rule out many of the explanations used to account for 
increasing careerism in Congress in searching for the influences on legislator 
tenure in the European Parliament. This paper therefore proposes three potential 
models of careerism in the European Parliament: an electoral systems model, a 
party model, and an individual model. While the data necessary to test these 
models has not been fully compiled, this paper outlines the major hypotheses of 
each model and details plans for the operationalization of all independent and 
control variables. These models are not intended to be mutually exclusive 
alternatives, but rather each explanation is expected to influence each MEP in 
varying degrees.  
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Introduction 
 
 What explains the length of a Member of the European Parliament’s 
career? Studies of the U.S. Congress have demonstrated dramatic growth in the 
length of tenure of congressmen since the turn of the 20th century. Most members 
of Congress develop professional congressional careers. Much less work has 
been done investigating legislator tenure in the European Parliament (EP), though 
members of the EP (MEPs) clearly do not exhibit the same level of careerism as 
their partners in Congress. The lack of evidence of careerism in the EP as well as 
the lack of studies of careerism in the EP may be due in part to the relative youth 
of the EP as a legislature. Patters of careerism or tenure are more difficult to 
uncover given that the EP is currently in just its sixth parliament since direct 
elections were instituted in 1979. Others, notably Scarrow (1997), have also 
highlighted the alternative career options open to MEPs who may treat service in 
the EP as either a stepping stone to a national political career or as a retirement 
home for former national politicians. Acknowledging the difficulties of tracing 
patterns of careerism in the EP, this paper seeks to build upon the work of 
Scarrow, who noted that levels of careerism are increasing gradually, by taking a 
more systematic approach to determine the institutional factors that may influence 
tenure rates of individual MEPs.   
Overview of the EP and Existing Literature 
 What is recognized today as the European Parliament has its roots in the 
“Common Assembly” of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
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holding its first meeting on September 10, 1952 and dubbing itself the “European 
Parliament” as the ECSC transitioned into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with the title becoming official in 1985 under the Single European Act 
(SEA). This body was referred to as a consultative assembly, having no legislative 
powers. In fact, until 1979, members of the EP were chosen by their respective 
national parliaments, not through direct elections. Over time, both the size and 
powers of the EP have grown. In 2007, David Farrell noted that, “for much of its 
life, the European Parliament could have been justly labeled a ‘multi-lingual 
talking shop’. But this is no longer the case: the EP is now one of the most 
powerful legislatures in the world both in terms of legislative and executive 
oversight powers.” It is this growing power that makes an understanding of MEPs’ 
career patterns increasingly important. As the power of the institution as a whole 
grows, so does the power of those legislators serving within the Parliament.  
 As mentioned, for most of its existence, the European Parliament held a 
merely consultative role in the legislative process. In the 1980s, after the 
implementation of direct election of MEPs, the EP gradually began accumulating 
power in terms of a positive role in the legislative process as well as the ability to 
exercise some forms of control over the executive institutions of the European 
Union. This assumulation of power meant that MEPs gained power as part of the 
institution. Table 1, borrowed from Hix, Noury & Roland (2007), provides a brief 
overview of the events through 2004 that led to significant changes in the power 
of the European Parliament. The original table has also been updated to reflect 
changes in the EP’s power since 2004. It is clear from the historical record of 
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institutional changes to the EP’s formal powers that both its legislative role and its 
ability to check the executive have increased substantially over time, resulting in 
the strong parliament referred to by Farrell. These growing powers have helped 
develop the legitimacy and prestige of the European Parliament and could have 
ramifications for the career aspirations of MEPs.  
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Table 1 
Event (date) Control of the executive Making legislation 
Treaty of Rome 
(1958) 
Commission censure 
procedure. EP can remove 
Commission by a  “double 
majority”; an absolute 
majority of MEPs plus two-
thirds of votes cast 
Consultation procedure. 
Council must consult EP 
before passing most legislation 
Budgetary 
Treaties (1970 
& 1975) 
 New budgetary procedure. EP 
can reject EU budget and can 
amend certain budget lines 
(mainly excluding agriculture 
and regional spending) 
First EP 
Elections 
(1979) 
EP has a source of 
legitimacy that is 
independent from national 
governments and national 
parliaments 
 
Single 
European Act 
(1987) 
 Cooperation procedure 
introduced. EP has two 
readings of bills before Council 
passes law (for most single-
market legislation) 
Maastricht 
Treaty (1993) 
New Commission investiture 
procedure. European Council 
must “consult” EP on 
nominee for Commission 
President 
Commission term of office 
reformed to coincide with 
EP’s five year term 
Co-decision procedure 
introduced. “Conciliation 
committee” convened if EP 
and Council disagree, but 
council can make a new 
proposal if still no agreement 
(replacing cooperation 
procedure) 
Opening 
session of 
Fourth 
Parliament 
(July 1994) 
EP votes on Comission 
President. EP votes for 
Jacques Santer (260 in favor 
vs. 238 against), setting the 
precedent that the EP can 
vote on the governments’ 
nominee for Commission 
President 
EP rejects Voice Telephony 
Directive. EP rejects a piece of 
EU legislation for the first time, 
setting the precedent that the 
Council cannot act unilaterally 
under the co-decision 
procedure 
Censure of 
Commission 
(March 1999) 
Commission resigns. Whole 
Santer Commission resigns 
after an EP report criticizing 
the Commission and before 
an EP censure vote that is 
likely to pass 
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Amsterdam 
Treaty (1999) 
Investiture procedure 
reformed. EP has vote on 
European Council’s nominee 
for Commission President 
and on the Commission as a 
whole 
Co-decision procedure 
reformed. Establishes a 
genuine bicameral system 
between the EP and Council 
(covers most socio-economic 
policies) 
Nice Treaty 
(2003) 
Investiture procedure 
reformed. European Council 
chooses Commission 
President and whole 
Commission by qualified-
majority (instead of 
unanimity), which increases 
the EP influence in the 
process 
 
Rejection of 
Commission 
(October 2004) 
Team of Commissioners 
withdrawn. Barroso 
withdraws proposed 
Commission on day of EP 
investiture vote because the 
EP is likely to reject the 
Commission 
 
Treaty of 
Lisbon (2009) 
 Ordinary legislative and 
consent procedures. Formerly 
known as the co-decision 
procedure and assent 
procedure, extends the use of 
these procedures, enhancing 
the strength of the EP  
Increased policy influence. EP 
is granted increased power 
over trade policy and the 
budget process 
  
Elections to the European Parliament are held every five years. As stated 
above, the constituents of each member state directly elect their MEPs. While the 
members states of the EU were able to agree on direct election of MEPs and five-
year terms, they were unable to reach consensus on other aspects of the 
electoral process, such as the electoral system used, the structure of 
constituencies within each member state and the precise timing of elections. 
8 
 
Ultimately there is significant variation across the member states in the number of 
citizens that MEPs represent, voting age, the structure of constituencies and the 
general electoral system (proportional representation is used throughout, but 
some states have preferential voting or single transferable vote systems as well 
as varying PR thresholds). Electoral characteristics obviously have an impact on 
MEP tenure rates, as MEPs must be re-elected to develop long careers.  
 While there are many discrepancies between the electoral systems of each 
member state, literature on the European Parliament has been quite clear that 
citizens across the board treat EP elections as “second-order elections”, which 
has led to a lack of electoral connection between EU citizens and their MEPs. 
Many have argued that this is a contributing factor to the EU’s democratic deficit, 
which could potentially be solved through the enhancement of the powers of the 
EP. This argument loses a lot of steam when the increases in the power of the 
European Parliament outlined in table 1 are compared to voter turnout rates, 
which have “declined in every election since the first direct elections in 1979”. 
There are several factors that contribute to low turnout, and therefore a weak 
electoral connection: 1) EP elections are not viewed with the same level of 
importance as national elections, because they do not determine the composition 
of the government or changes in policy platforms; 2) EP electoral campaigns tend 
to lack focus; and 3) the major players in national elections do not put nearly as 
much effort into EP elections. There is not much at stake in terms of the direction 
and governance of the EU as a whole because the composition of the EP does 
not in turn determine the composition of the Council or the Commission, and that 
9 
 
fact contributes to disinterest in the electorate. Add to the general lack of 
enthusiasm amongst voters the fact that EP candidates rarely campaign on 
European issues, and the result is a European-level position contested over 
national concerns, which only serves to muddy the water and confuse and 
alienate voters. The lack of big name candidates and the hesitance of national 
parties to expend resources on EP campaigns have also contributed to the low 
salience of EP elections. Some governments even “play down the importance of 
the elections because they are frequently interpreted as being in part at least, 
‘mid-term’ national elections, or unofficial referendums on the government’s 
performance in office”. Recent scholarship has set out to challenge some of these 
accepted characterizations of EP elections, finding that voters do respond 
favorably to parties that nominate the most experienced candidates. While this 
finding does not reverse the impact of low-salience among the electorate and 
declining voter turnout, it does suggest that there is some semblance of an 
electoral connection that exists between EU citizens and their MEPs.   
 The central work on careers in the European Parliament is that of 
Scarrow’s “Political Career Paths and the European Parliament” (1997). In fact, it 
is one of the only studies to examine EP careers. She notes that prior literature on 
EP careers has been “either anecdotal (Corbett, Jacobs, Richardson 1995), or 
confined to a single country (Westlake 1994)”. Scarrow moves beyond those 
studies by analyzing the career paths of MEPs from the French, German, British 
and Italian national delegations. The case selection depended primarily on the 
availability of the necessary biographical data on MEPs. By tracking the length of 
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individual MEP careers and the prior offices held by MEPs Scarrow determines 
that there are three career paths in the EP. MEPs either use their service in the 
EP as a stepping-stone to gain experience before returning to national politics; as 
a means to pursue a purely European career; or as a retirement home after 
services in the national arena no longer is feasible.  
The Models 
 Given the lack of literature on careerism in the European Parliament, 
despite some evidence that “the European Parliament is beginning to attract 
delegates who serve long European careers”, this paper suggests looking for 
potential sources of variation in tenure rates between MEPs. It seems likely that 
this variation could be found in three broad areas: the electoral system and the 
qualities of the electorate of a MEP’s member state; the characteristics of a 
MEP’s political party; and the qualities of the individual MEP.  
 I therefore propose three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, 
explanations of an MEP’s length of tenure: 1) an electoral systems model; 2) a 
party model; and 3) an individual model. In outlining these three models I do not 
intend to suggest that any one model is better at explaining MEP career lengths 
than the rest. Rather, I expect that all three models have an effect on tenure rates, 
but that the relative influence of each model will vary across delegations. I shall 
now turn to a more detailed account of the three models, their hypotheses and the 
proposed operationalization of independent and control variables. Throughout all 
of these models, the dependent variable, MEP career tenure, is the length of an 
individual MEP’s service in the European Parliament measured in months. The 
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decision to measure career tenure in months instead of years is to make this 
project more suitable to event history analysis and increase each model’s 
precision. Many MEPs do not serve full terms. Particularly in the early terms just 
after the implementation of direct elections, it was common for MEPs to leave 
their posts months, if not years before the end of their terms. Therefore, 
measuring career length in months seems the most appropriate unit for MEPs.  
Electoral Systems Model 
 This explanation suggests that certain characteristics of a MEPs member 
state, specifically the electoral system and features of the electorate, will 
significantly influence an individual MEP’s career length. As mentioned above, 
electoral processes can vary significantly across member states. This model 
seeks to tap that variation to determine its impact on individual MEP tenure rates. 
There are three hypotheses associated with this model. 
H1: Electoral Rules Hypothesis. MEPs elected through systems using preferential 
voting, or single transferable vote are more likely to have longer careers than 
MEPs elected from proportional representation systems that use party lists.  
 
 This hypothesis assumes that preferential voting systems allow candidates 
for the European Parliament more control over their electoral fortunes than the 
party list system. An electoral system that allows for preferential voting takes 
control away from parties that would likely prefer to use a party list. Therefore, it 
will be necessary to code the electoral system of each member state according to 
whether preferential voting or party list systems are employed for European 
Parliament elections. Preferential voting and party lists are not the only 
differences one might see between member states’ electoral systems, however. 
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Some states also employ vote percentage thresholds that parties must meet in 
order to be considered in the allocation of seats in the European Parliament. 
Therefore, in addition to the electoral rules hypothesis, it would be expected that 
as a country’s vote threshold increases, the tenure rates of MEPs from that state 
are likely to decrease. This could become a separate hypothesis, or for the sake 
of keeping the model as simple as possible, a country’s vote percentage threshold 
could be treated as a control variable. The next two hypotheses are closely linked 
and concern characteristics of each member state’s electorate. 
H2: Voter Turnout Hypothesis. The higher the level of voter turnout in a given 
member state, the more likely an MEP from that member state will have a longer 
career than MEPs from states with lower voter turnout.  
 
 Those who turn out to vote can usually be assumed to be the most 
politically interested members of the electorate as a whole. Strategic voting 
calculus, though an oversimplification, does suggest that there are many costs 
and obstacles that individuals must overcome just to cast a vote. Therefore, a 
high level of voter turnout could be an indication of high levels of interest in the 
electoral outcomes, or increased issue saliency. The voter turnout hypothesis 
suggests that the extra attention paid to elections that is often accompanied by 
high level of voter turnout may lead to more incumbent MEPs being elected 
(assuming they have disproportionate access to media and other campaign 
resources compared to their challengers). Voter turnout will be operationalized 
using the percentage of the voting age population who voted in the last European 
Parliament election. Because voter turnout has many facets, adding a couple 
control variables should help keep things clear. The first should control for voter 
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turnout from the most recent national (not European Parliament) election. The 
second is a dummy variable that codes whether or not a member state employs 
compulsory voting laws.  
H3: Political Awareness Hypothesis. The more politically aware a member state’s 
electorate is, the more likely an MEP from that state will have a longer career than 
an MEP from a state with lower political awareness.  
 
Along the same lines as voter turnout, the political awareness hypothesis 
suggests that a more politically aware electorate will be more likely to elect quality 
candidates, and will subsequently re-elect MEPs that meet their expectations. 
While most studies have shown that voters in general are not particularly aware, it 
would be interesting to see if national variation in political awareness influences 
the career lengths of individual MEPs. Operationalizing political awareness is 
typically a difficult task, which is compounded in this case by the need for a cross-
national measure of political awareness. Luckily, there are sources of EU-wide 
public opinion polling, such as the Eurobarometer, which could be used to piece 
together a measure of political awareness for each member state. Specifically, the 
base Eurobarometer survey includes a section on EU awareness, which asks 
respondents if they are aware of various EU institutions, and it contains a section 
on objective knowledge of the EU, which asks respondent general knowledge 
questions about EU law, institutions, electoral practices etc. By compiling the 
responses to these questions by member state, it would be possible to compute 
an overall awareness score for each country. 
Some additional control variables for this model are the length of the 
state’s EU membership, the member state’s region, and the number of citizens 
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represented by each MEP, and a measure of party competition. Keeping in line 
with the operationalization of the dependent variable, the length of a state’s 
membership in the European Union will be measured in months. To control for 
potential regional variation, the model will include a regional dummy variable. The 
member states will be divided into four regions: North, South, East and West. The 
Northern region will include Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom; the southern region will include 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain; the eastern region will include 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania; and the western 
region will include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.  These are the same regional classifications used by the United 
Nations. The number of citizens represented by an MEP will be calculated for 
each member state by dividing the population total by the number of MEPs for the 
given country. And finally, the model will also control for the level of party 
competition in each electoral system. Following Sartori’s lead, each member state 
will be coded based on the number of political parties competing in European 
Parliament elections. This measure is rather crude, but for a control variable it 
should more or less accurately account for the level of party competition in each 
member state for European Parliament elections.  
 
Party Model 
 This explanation suggests that characteristics of a MEP’s national party, or 
party group may affect the career length of individual MEPs. As noted above, 
political parties play a central role both within the European Parliament, as well as 
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in the EP election process of each member state. In general the two primary 
characteristics of parties that are expected to influence MEP tenure rates are the 
party’s ideology, and it’s control over the EP electoral process.  
H4: EU Integration Stance Hypothesis. A MEP from a party that with strong views 
on European Union integration will be more likely to serve a longer career than a 
MEP from a party with moderate views on EU integration.  
  
 This hypothesis suggests that MEPs from parties with extreme views on 
European Union integration, whether positive or negative, are more likely to have 
a consistent base of electoral support than those whose parties have more 
moderate views on integration. There are many reasons to expect this to be true. 
Extreme views tend to be better understood by the electorate than subtle, 
nuanced views, which may provide a party with extreme views more support than 
a moderate party. These parties with more extreme integration views are also 
more likely to be small parties, meaning the number of available politicians to be 
nominated for MEP position is less than a larger party might have. This could 
mean there is less competition for EP seats, so if the party is allocated any seats 
in the Parliament, the same people are likely to be given those position in 
consecutive elections.  
It may seem counterintuitive that MEPs from parties that oppose European 
Union integration may be in a position to serve longer careers than some of their 
more moderate peers. In fact, some anti-EU integration parties would be less 
likely to have MEPs that serve long careers. It is my contention, however, that 
these parties are overall less likely to participate in European Parliament 
elections. The anti-EU integration parties to which the EU Integration Stance 
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hypothesis refers, are those that choose to work toward their anti-system goals 
from within the system, rather than from the outside.  
To operationalize a party’s stance on EU integration would require the 
coding of each party’s electoral platform, looking for specific mentions of their 
position on EU integration. To begin with, I would use a rather rudimentary three-
point scale (anti-integration, neutral/no mention, and pro-integration) to see if 
there are any broad trends, but this variable could be broken down into a more 
detailed scale as well. An analysis of party platforms could also be supplemented 
by a content analysis of the statements or publications of party leaders, legislators 
or other members. This would be particularly useful in situations in which a party 
has either not specified their EU integration preferences in their platform, or if the 
preference stated in their platform does not seem to line up with their general 
ideology or the actions of their members.  
H5: Party Ideology Hypothesis. A MEP whose party’s platform falls on either 
extreme of the left/right ideological spectrum will serve a shorter career than an 
MEP from a more moderate political party.   
 
 Because European Parliament elections do not receive a lot of attention 
from most voters or the media and are not seen as politically significant in much 
of the electorate, fringe parties may have a greater chance of winning seats in the 
European Parliament. By this same token, however, fringe parties may also have 
a greater chance of being replaced by competing fringe parties from election to 
election, which would prevent their MEPs from developing careers within the 
Parliament. 
 To test this hypothesis, each party’s position on the left/right ideological 
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spectrum would need to be coded. This could be done on variety of different 
scales, such as a 100-point thermometer scale, or a five- or seven-point ordinal 
scale. Several possible sources exist for compiling this measure such as 
Nominate scores, and the Comparative Manifestos Project. It also would make 
sense to divide party ideology into two separate variables, one for the party’s 
ideological position relative to the other parties in their national electoral system, 
and another for the party’s ideological placement within the European Parliament.  
H6: Electoral Connection Hypothesis. A MEP from a party that has established an 
electoral connection with voters will be more likely to serve a long career.  
 
 As mentioned above, Hobolt & Hoyland (2011) have demonstrated that 
some parties are more adept than others at establishing an electoral connection 
with their constituents and are rewarded when they nominate experienced and 
qualified candidates. It therefore stands to reason that the parties that have 
mastered this electoral connection will be more likely to have MEPs that serve 
longer careers than MEPs of parties that do not have a strong electoral 
connection.  
H7: Nomination Process Hypothesis. A MEP from a party that follows a 
centralized nomination process will serve a shorter career than a MEP from a 
party that uses a decentralized nomination process.  
 
 Because the national political parties have rather tight control over 
nominations to the European Parliament, and therefore control who has the 
opportunity to become an MEP, individual party nomination processes are likely to 
have an effect on MEP career rates. Here the U.S. congressional literature may 
be able to shed some light on the logic of this process. If one conceives of the 
national European parties as Europe’s political machines, which I believe is a 
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reasonable jump to make, the relative centralization of nomination processes may 
have an impact on the length of MEP tenure. Congressional tenure rates did not 
increase dramatically until after the decline of machine politics in the United 
States. The stranglehold that the machines had on the nomination of 
congressional candidates allowed them to replace congressmen as they saw fit, 
preventing any one person from gaining too much power within the institution. But 
once this power over nominations diminished, congressmen were able to mold 
their institution to facilitate the development of congressional careers. I therefore 
believe that a national party with a highly centralized EP nominations process, in 
which only a few key party leaders make the ultimate decision on candidate 
nominations or lists, will be less likely to have MEPs that develop long European 
careers. Those parties who nominate EP candidates through a more 
decentralized process, such as allowing all party members to cast a vote on 
nominees, will be more likely to have MEPs that develop long European careers, 
taking advantages of the resources offered to them by the Parliament. This 
hypothesis rests upon the assumption that a smaller group of decision-makers will 
expect more control over MEPs and will have a better chance of making changes 
to candidate lists if dissatisfied with MEP behavior. Conversely, an MEP would be 
expected to have a better chance of securing the requisite portion of party 
member votes in a more decentralized nomination process.  
 To operationalize the nominations process variable will require extensive 
coding of party statutes to uncover their specific rules and regulations regarding 
nominations for the European Parliament. It would be important to note whether 
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party leaders, parliamentary groups, party congress, general membership etc. 
control the nomination process. This coding should be supplemented by a follow-
up analysis to determine whether the party actually abides by its statutes 
regarding. Studies have suggested that some political parties have 
“democratized” or decentralized their nomination processes in name only, 
opening them up to the entire party membership, but using mail-in ballots for 
instance, to discourage participation and the formation of alliances that would 
occur more naturally at a membership meeting. It would also be important to add 
a variable to control for countries that allow individuals to nominate themselves, to 
be nominated through petitions, or those systems that require deposits from 
nominees.  
The control variables for this model are the size and age of a given MEP’s 
political party, the number of consecutive terms the party has been present in the 
EP, the presence of a MEP’s national party in their national parliament, and 
whether the national party is a member of the national government. The size of a 
party will be measured by the number of members the party has. Often 
membership requires a formal application, and most parties keep track of their 
membership statistics. In some cases, political parties may give special status to 
some members over others based on their contributions to the party (financial or 
otherwise) or their length of membership in the party. All effort will be made to find 
more general membership totals, but if none exist, the members with special 
status will be counted instead.  
The age of a party will be measured in months, and national party registers 
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will be used to track the dissolution and reformation of parties over time. A party’s 
presence in the European Parliament will be measured by the number of 
consecutive months at least one MEP from that party has been present in the 
Parliament. This model will also control for a party’s presence in their national 
parliament as well. This variable will be a simple dummy variable coded 1 if the 
party currently has legislators in the national parliament, and 0 if it does not. In 
addition to whether the party is merely present in the national parliament, this 
model will also control for whether or not the party is part of the national 
government coalition, or a member of the parliamentary opposition. 
Individual Model 
 This individual explanation suggests the characteristics of a given MEP 
that may influence their career length. While the above discussion has tried to 
argue that characteristics of the electoral system and the qualities of an MEP’s 
political party will have an impact on their career tenure, perhaps the most 
obvious source of variation in MEP career lengths is the individual legislators 
themselves. As with political parties, ideology is expected to play a prominent role 
in this model, as are the institutional positions held by the individual within the 
Parliament.  
H8: Individual Ideology Hypothesis. A MEP with ideologically extreme political 
views will serve a shorter career than a MEP with more moderate political 
positions.  
 
 This hypothesis is similar in expectation to the Party Ideology hypothesis. 
Due to the flippant nature in which many EU voters treat European Parliament 
elections, some ideologically extreme candidates will surely win seats in the 
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Parliament. These same candidates, however, will also be less likely to maintain 
careers within the European Parliament because of the same ideological 
extremity that may have gotten them elected in the first place. The only possible 
exception to this hypothesis is if there was a single extreme political party within 
an electoral system with a constant base of support, so that the party won either a 
single seat or only a small amount of seats from election to election, allowing for 
the possibility that one of their MEPs could develop a lengthy European career.  
 Individual ideology is probably best operationalized through Nominate 
scores, or through MEP surveys like those carried out by the European 
Legislative Politics Research Group (though their surveys only go back to the Fifth 
Parliament). While the ELPRG surveys are only available for the Fifth and Sixth 
Parliaments, they could be extremely useful in judging the overall accuracy of 
Nominate scores in assessing individual MEP’s ideology. 
H9: Leadership Position Hypothesis. A MEP with a leadership position within the 
EP will serve a longer career than a MEP without an EP leadership position. 
 
 Legislative leadership positions bestow upon individuals a higher level of 
policy influence and control over certain aspects of legislative activity, depending 
on the status of their leadership position. Thus, not only should holding a 
leadership position provide a greater incentive for MEPs to remain in the 
European Parliament, since individual MEPs in such positions can exert more 
influence over legislative affairs, but political parties may also encourage their 
MEPs to stay in the EP once they have attained such positions as a way of 
enhancing the role of the party within the institution as well. To test this 
hypothesis, MEPs would need to be coded based on their leadership positions, 
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such as president, vice president, committee chairman, committee bureau 
member, or committee secretariat member. 
H10:  Committee Membership Hypothesis. A MEP that serves on a committee 
with either high levels of budgetary discretion and/or high levels of policy influence 
will serve a longer career than a MEP on a committee with low levels of budgetary 
discretion and/or policy influence.  
 
 As in the U.S. Congress, not all committees in the European Parliament 
are created equal. Certain committees will be more coveted by MEPs than others 
due to their greater legislative of budgetary influence. If an MEP serves on a 
powerful committee, they would be expected to serve longer careers compared 
with MEPs that serve on less powerful committees. This hypothesis would require 
the coding of all EP committees based on their budgetary influence or discretion 
as well as their overall policy influence. This policy influence variable may be 
developed even further by ranking committees based on the relative importance 
of their policy domain. An additional variable controlling for the number of 
consecutive months an MEP has spent on the same committee should also be 
included in this model.  
The proposed control variables for this model are the individual MEP’s age, 
and the salary trade off between a career as a legislator in the European 
Parliament and a career as a legislator in the national parliament of the MEP’s 
member state. The operationalization of these variables will be straightforward, 
with age measured as each MEP’s age in years and the salary trade off 
measured as the difference between the salary for a rank-and-file MEP and the 
salary of the average MP from their member state. These variables will help 
control for the age-related career patterns Scarrow noted as the EP as a 
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stepping-stone for younger politicians or a retirement home for older politicians. It 
will also control for the influence of material incentives on an MEP’s career 
decisions. 
Conclusion 
 While this paper is concerned with variation in careerism between 
individual MEPs, there also appears to be potential in uncovering structural 
influences that would affect overall patterns of careerism within the EP. In 
general, I expect careerism in the European Parliament to increase over time, 
though perhaps not to the same levels seen in the U.S. Congress. In particular, 
changes in the power or prestige of the European Parliament, or in the saliency of 
European Union issues that fall under the purview of the EP may influence rates 
of careerism. I would propose the following hypotheses.  
Structural Hypothesis 1: As the institutional influence and prestige of the 
European Parliament increases, so will general trends of careerism increase for 
MEPs overall. 
 
It is expected that as the European Parliament gains strength and 
influence as an institution, careers within it will become more appealing and 
encourage many to pursue purely European careers. Many scholars of 
Congressional careerism note that one of the main drivers encouraging the 
professionalization of congressmen was the growing size and importance of the 
federal government.   
 
Structural Hypothesis 2: As the salience of European Union issues under the 
purview of the European Parliament increases, so will general trends of careerism 
increase for MEPs overall.  
 
Clearly related to the prior hypothesis concerning the reputation and 
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influence of the EP as an institution, as the European Parliament continues to 
gain both legislative and executive oversight powers, service in the EP will have a 
greater impact and therefore be viewed as more rewarding. This too has been 
noted in the Congressional literature. As the federal government grew, Congress 
began gaining control over many issues, which had previously been the purview 
of state legislatures and local governments. 
 
Overall, the research agenda of EP careerism seems promising and ripe 
for both qualitative and quantitative study. While this project will be tested through 
a large-N quantitative study, it could easily benefit from case study supplements 
from either individual MEPs or whole national delegations. It is also my hope that 
the dataset needed to test the above hypotheses would lend itself to many more 
interesting research questions. European Union scholars have largely ignored the 
European Parliament, but I think it is clear that as the power of the EP grows, its 
relevance to EU scholars should increase as well.  
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